Leitung: Prof. Dr. Karl Christoph Klauer,
Prof. Dr. Sieghard Beller
Beteiligt: Henrik Singmann
Institution: Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, University of Bergen
Abstract
According to the dual source model of probabilistic conditional inference (Klauer, Beller, & Hütter, 2010), human inferences draw on
two sources of information: The syntactical form of given premises and content-specific background knowledge. We assume that the form-based
component of the model is driven by a (resource-limited and fallible) monotonic system of reasoning, whereas the knowledge-based component
is driven by summary assessments of chronically and momentarily salient beliefs, violating, across different contexts, coherence and
monotonicity. The model is to be applied to three groups of classical problems: 1) Context effects, in particular suppression effects and
effects of speaker expertise. Suppression effects are frequently seen as evidence for non-monotonic human reasoning and should thus map on
the knowledge-based component of our model, whereas superficially similar effects of speaker expertise should map on the relative weight
of form-based versus knowledge-based evidence. 2) The model is to be extended to other conjunctions than "if-then" to see whether the
different syntactical forms are mapped on the form-based component in a manner consistent with the existence of a mental logic. 3) The
relative role of cognitive resources for the knowledge-based and the form-based components of the model is to be assessed.
Projektrelevante Veröffentlichungen
Singmann, H., Klauer, K. C., & Over, D. (2014).
New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.
Klauer, K. C., & Singmann, H. (2013). Does logic feel good? Testing for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(4), 1265-1273.
Singmann, H., & Klauer, K. C. (2011).
Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 17(3), 247-281.
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