Beteiligt: Naftali Weinberger
Institution: Tilburg University
Abstract
Our aim is to provide a systematic, comparative account of causal and explanatory reasoning embedded into probabilistic (Bayesian) reasoning, a leading theory of rationality. We proceed in three steps. In Subproject A, "Explanatory Value: A Causal Concept?" we examine how explanatory value is affected by causal considerations and by probabilistic information, and we explore the uncharted terrain concerning non-causal explanation and explanatory value. In Subproject B. "Explanatory Power and Causal Strength," we explicate the notion of causal strength and relate it to the one of explanatory power. Similarities and differences between the two notions are elucidated, and we develop and compare Bayesian explications of both concepts. Finally, in Subproject C. "Unifying Causal and Explanatory Reasoning. Prospects," we synthesise the results of Subprojects A and B, evaluating the prospects of a unified theory of causal and explanatory reasoning within a probabilistic framework.
Projektrelevante Veröffentlichungen
Colombo, M. (2016). Experimental philosophy of explanation rising: The case for a plurality of concepts of explanation. Cognitive Science, 1-15.
Colombo, M., & Hartmann, S. (2015). Bayesian cognitive science, unification, and explanation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Sprenger, J. (2015). A novel solution to the problem of old evidence. Philosophy of Science, 82, 383-401 .
Weitere Publikationen sind auf dieser Seite zu finden.
Bezug zur ersten Förderperiode des SPP1516
Projekt "Explanatory Reasoning: Normative and Empirical Considerations" (Hartmann/Sprenger)