In press

  • Colombo, M., Lai, J., & Crupi, V. (in press). Sleeping Beauty goes to the lab: The psychology of self-locating evidence. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
  • Gazzo Castañeda, L. E., & Knauff, M. (in press). The specificity of terms affects conditional reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning.
  • Koscholke, J., & Schippers, M. (in press). Coherence and common causes: Against relevance-sensitive measures of coherence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1-12.
  • Moussaïd, M., Herzog, S. M., Kämmer, J. E., & Hertwig, R. (in press). Reach and speed of judgment propagation in the laboratory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
  • Weinberger, N. (in press). Path-specific effects. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

    • 2018

  • Beierle, C., Eichhorn, C., Kern-Isberner, G., & Kutsch, S. (2018). Properties of skeptical c-inference for conditional knowledge bases and its realization as a constraint satisfaction problem. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 83, 247-275.
  • Coenen, A., Nelson, J. D., Gureckis, T. M. (2018). Asking the right questions about the psychology of human inquiry: Nine open challenges. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review.
  • Colombo, M. (2018). Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debate. Synthese, 195, 4817-4838.
  • Colombo, M., Duev, G., Nujten, M., & Sprenger, J. (2018). Statistical reporting inconsistencies in experimental philosophy. PLOS ONE, 13(4): e0194360.
  • Colombo, M., & Weinberger, N. (2018). Discovering Brain Mechanisms Using Network Analysis and Causal Modeling. Minds and Machines, 28, 265-286 .
  • Crupi, V., Nelson, J. D., Meder, B., Cevolani, G., & Tentori, K. (2018). Generalized information theory meets human cognition: Introducing a unified framework to model uncertainty and information search. Cognitive Science, 42, 1410-1456..
  • Douven, I., & Rott, H. (2018). From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models. Journal of Logic and Computation, exy017.
  • Forster, M., Raskutti, G., Stern, R., & Weinberger, N. (2018). The frugal inference of causal relations. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69, 821-848.
  • Gazzo Castañeda, L. E., & Knauff, M. (2018). Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules. Thinking & Reasoning, 24(3), 344-365.
  • Klein, D., & Colombo, M. (2018). Mystery and the evidential impact of unexplainables. Episteme, 15, 463-475.
    [This article was discussed by Tania Lombrozo in 13.7: Cosmos & Culture]
  • Sanfilippo, G., Pfeifer, N., Over, D. E., & Gilio, A. (2018). Probabilistic inferences from conjoined to iterated conditionals. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 93, 103-118.
  • Schurz, G. (2018). Impossibility Results for Rational Belief. Noûs.
  • Spohn, W. (2018). Epistemic justification: Its subjective and its objective ways. Synthese.
  • Spohn, W. (2018). How the modalities come into the world. Erkenntnis, 83, 89-112.
  • Sprenger, J. (2018). Foundations of a probabilistic theory of causal strength. The Philosophical Review, 127, 371-398.
  • Tentori, K., Pighin, S., Divan, C., & Crupi, V. (2018). Mind the gap: Physicians' assessment of patients' importance weights in localized prostate cancer. PLoS ONE 13(7): e0200780 .
  • Thorn, P. (2018). Induction by Direct Inference Meets the Goodman Problem. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy.
  • Voelkel, J.G., Brandt, M.J., & Colombo, M. (2018). I know that I know nothing: Can puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth overcome the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice? Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology, 3, 56-78.

    • 2017

  • Beierle, C., Eichhorn, C., & Kutsch, S. (2017). A practical comparison of qualitative inferences with preferred ranking models. Künstliche Intelligenz, 31(1), 41-52.
  • Cevolani, G., & Schurz, G. (2017). Probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness: More ways out of the preface paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(2), 209-225.
  • Colombo, M. (2017). Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising. The case for a plurality of concepts of explanation. Cognitive Science, 41, 503-517.
  • Colombo, M. (2017). Why build a virtual brain? Large-scale neural simulations as jump start for cognitive computing. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 29(2), 361-370.
  • Colombo, M., Bucher, L., & Sprenger, J. (2017). Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1430.
  • Colombo, M., Gervais, R., & Sprenger, J. (2017). Introduction: Objectivity in science. Synthese, 194, 4641-4642.
  • Colombo, M., & Hartmann, S. (2017). Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation. The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 68, 451-484.
  • Colombo, M., & Wright, C. D. (2017). Explanatory pluralism: An unrewarding prediction error for free energy theorists. Brain and Cognition, 122 , 3-12.
  • Hertwig, R., & Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2017). Nudging and boosting: Steering or empowering good decisions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12, 973-986.
  • Jarecki, J., Meder, B., & Nelson, J. D. (2017). Naïve and robust: Class-conditional independence in human classification learning. Cognitive Science.
  • Knauber, H. M., Schray, H. H., Meder, B., Martignon, L. F., & Nelson, J. D. (2017). Informationssuche im Mathematikunterricht der Grundschule - Zahlenbeispiele und Fabelwesen als mögliches Lern-Lehrarrangement [Information search in mathematics teaching in primary school: Number games and mythical creatures as a possible learning-teaching arrangement]. MNU Journal, 6, 375-382.
  • Meder, B. & Mayrhofer, R. (2017). Diagnostic causal reasoning with verbal information. Cognitive Psychology, 96, 54-84.
  • Pachur, T., Mata, R., & Hertwig, R. (2017). Who errs, who dares? Disentangling cognitive and motivational roots of age differences in decisions under risk. Psychological Science.
  • Pachur, T., Suter, R. S., & Hertwig, R. (2017). How the twain can meet: Prospect theory and models of heuristics in risky choice. Cognitive Psychology, 93, , 44-73.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Sanfilippo, G. (2017). Probabilistic squares and hexagons of opposition under coherence. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 88, 282-294.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Tulkki, L. (2017). Conditionals, counterfactuals, and rational reasoning. An experimental study on basic principles. Minds and Machines, 27, 119-165.
  • Ragni, M., Eichhorn, C., Bock, T., Kern-Isberner, G., & Ping Ping Tse, Alice (2017). Formal nonmonotonic theories and properties of human defeasible reasoning. Minds and Machines, 27(1), 79-117.
  • Rehder, B., & Waldmann, M. R. (2017). Failures of explaining away and screening off in described versus experienced causal learning scenarios. Memory & Cognition, 45(2), 245-260.
  • Rott, H. (2017). Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief. Synthese, 194, 2695-2720.
  • Rott, H. (2017). Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test. Mind, 126(502), 609-626.
  • Rott, H. (2017). Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs. Minds and Machines, 27, 167-197.
  • Schippers, M., & Schurz, G. (2017). Genuine coherence as mutual confirmation between content elements. Studia Logica, 105(2), 299-329.
  • Schurz, G. (2017). Optimality justifications: New foundations for foundation-oriented epistemology. Synthese.
  • Schurz, G. (2017). No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science, 84, 825-839.
  • Schurz, G. (2017). Optimality justifications: New foundations for foundation-oriented epistemology. Synthese, 1-21.
  • Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Kellen, D., Krahl, H., and Klauer, K. C. (2017). Relevance differently affects the truth, acceptability, and probability evaluations of 'And', 'But', 'Therefore', and 'If Then'. Thinking and Reasoning, 23, 449-482.
  • Spohn, W. (2017) Knightian Uncertainty Meets Ranking Theory. Homo Oeconomicus,34, 293-311.
  • Spohn, W. (2017). The epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness. Ergo, 4, 359-418.
  • Stenning, K., Martignon, L., & Varga, A. (2017). Probability-free judgment: Integrating fast and frugal heuristics with a logic of interpretation. Decision, 4, 171-196.
  • Thorn, P. D. (2017). Against deductive closure. Theoria, 83(2), 103-119.
  • Thorn, P. (2017). A Note Concerning Infinite Regresses of Deferred Justification. Philosophia, 45, 349-357.
  • Thorn, P. D. (2017). On the preference for more specific reference classes. Synthese, 194, 2025-2051.
  • Weinberger, N. (2017). Faithfulness, coordination, and causal coincidences. Erkenntnis.
  • Woike, J. K., Hoffrage, U., & Martignon, L. (2017). Integrating and testing natural frequencies, naïve Bayes, and fast-and-frugal trees. Decision, 4, 234-260.
  • Wright, C., Colombo, M., & Beard, A. (2017). HIT and Brain Reward Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity (Theory). History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 64, 28-40.
  • Wu, C. M., Meder, B., Filimon, F., & Nelson, J. D. (2017). Asking better questions: How presentation formats influence information search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition.

    • 2016

  • Arkes, H. R., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R.(2016). How bad is incoherence? Decision, 3, 20-39.
  • Colombo, M. (2016). Experimental philosophy of explanation rising: The case for a plurality of concepts of explanation. Cognitive Science, 1-15.
  • Colombo, M., Bucher, L., & Inbar, Y. (2016). Explanatory judgment, moral offense and value-free science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), 743-763.
  • Crupi, V. (2016). Inductive logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44 (The Fortieth Anniversary Issue), 641-650.
  • Crupi, V., & Tentori, K. (2016). Noisy probability judgment, the conjunction fallacy, and rationality: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014). Psychological Review, 123, 97-102.
  • Eichhorn, C., Fey, M., & Kern-Isberner, G. (2016). CP- and OCF-networks—a comparison. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 298, 109-127.
  • Elia F., Aprà F., Verhovez A., & Crupi V. (2016). "First, know thyself": Cognition and error in medicine. Acta Diabetologica, 53, 169-175.
  • Elkin, L., & Wheeler, G. (2016). Resolving peer disagreements through imprecise probabilities. Nous.
  • Gazzo Castañeda, L. E., & Knauff, M. (2016). Defeasible reasoning with legal conditionals. Memory and Cognition, 44 (3), 499-517.
  • Gazzo Castañeda, L. E., & Knauff, M. (2016). When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(8), 1480-1497.
  • Gazzo Castañeda, L. E., Richter, B., & Knauff, M. (2016). Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 22 (2), 209-220.
  • Gilio, A., Pfeifer, N., & Sanfilippo, G. (2016). Transitivity in coherence-based probability logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 14, 46-64.
  • Hertwig, R., & Engel, C. (2016). Homo ignorans: Deliberately choosing not to know. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 359-372.
  • Hertwig, R., & Pedersen, A. P. (2016). Finding foundations for bounded and adaptive rationality. Minds and Machines, 26 (1-2), 1-8.
  • Kellen, D., Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2016). How (in)variant are subjective representations of described and experienced risk and rewards? Cognition, 157, 126-138.
  • Koscholke, J. (2016). Carnap's relevance measure as probabilistic measure of coherence. Erkenntnis, 1-12.
  • Koscholke, J. (2016). Evaluating test cases for probabilistic measures of coherence. Erkenntnis, 81(1), 155-181.
  • Koscholke, J., & Jekel, M. (2016). Probabilistic coherence measures: A psychological study of coherence assessment. Synthese.
  • Mayo-Wilson, C., & Wheeler, G. (2016). Scoring imprecise credences: A mildly immodest proposal. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 93(1), 55-78.
  • Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2016). Causal agency and the perception of force. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(3), 789-796.
  • Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2016). Sufficiency and necessity assumptions in causal structure induction. Cognitive Science, 40, 2137-2150.
  • Moussaïd, M., Kapadia, M., Thrash, T., Sumner, R. W., Gross, M., Helbing, D. & Hoelscher, C (2016). Crowd behaviour during high-stress evacuations in an immersive virtual environment. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 13, 1-8.
  • Moussaïd, M., & Seyed Yahosseini, K. (2016). Can simple transmission chains foster collective intelligence in binary-choice tasks?. PLoS ONE, 11(11), 1-17.
  • Moussaïd, M., & Trauernicht, M. (2016). Patterns of cooperation during collective emergencies in the help-or-escape social dilemma. Scientific Reports, 6, 1-9.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2016). Experimental probabilistic pragmatics beyond Bayes' theorem. Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft, 35 (1), 89-96.
  • Ragni, M., Franzmeier, I., Maier, S., & Knauff, M. (2016). Uncertain relational reasoning in the parietal cortex. Brain & Cognition, 104, 72-81.
  • Raidl, E., & Skovgaard-Olsen, N. (2016). Bridging ranking theory and the stability theory of belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
  • Samland, J., Josephs, M., Waldmann, M. R. & Rakoczy, H. (2016). The role of prescriptive norms and knowledge in children's and adults' causal selection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145(2), 125-130.
  • Samland, J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2016). How prescriptive norms influence causal inferences. Cognition, 156, 164-176.
  • Schippers, M. (2016). The problem of coherence and truth redux. Erkenntnis.
  • Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets. Synthese, 193 (4), 1073-1103.
  • Schurz, G., & Thorn, P. D. (2016). The revenge of ecological rationality: Strategy-selection by meta-induction within changing environments. Minds and Machines, 26 (1-2), 31-59.
  • Singmann, H., Klauer, K. C., & Beller, S. (2016). Probabilistic conditional reasoning: Disentangling form and content with the dual-source model. Cognitive Psychology, 88, 61-87.
  • Skovgaard-Olsen, N. (2016). Motivating the Relevance Approach to Conditionals. Mind & Language, 31 (5), 555-579.
  • Skovgaard-Olsen, N. (2016). Ranking theory and conditional reasoning. Cognitive Science, 40 (4), 848-880.
  • Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Singmann, H., & Klauer, K.C. (2016). Relevance and reason relations. Cognitive Science.
  • Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Singmann, H., & Klauer, K. C. (2016). The relevance effect and conditionals. Cognition, 150, 26-36.
  • Spohn, W. (2016). Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth. Philosophical Studies, 173, 1335-1359.
  • Spohn, W. (2016). Truth and rationality. Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology, and Political Science, 36, 7-19.
  • Suter, R. S., Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2016). How affect shapes risky choice: Distorted probability weighting versus probability neglect. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 29, 437-449.
  • Tentori, K., Chater, N., & Crupi, V. (2016). Judging the probability of hypotheses versus the impact of evidence: which form of inductive inference is more accurate and time-consistent? Cognitive Science, 40 (3), 758-778.
  • Thorn, P. D., & Schurz, G. (2016). Qualitative probabilistic inference under varied entropy levels. Journal of Applied Logic, 19, 87-101.
  • von Sydow, M. (2016). Towards a pattern-based logic of probability judgements and logical inclusion "fallacies". Thinking & Reasoning, 22 (3), 297-335.
  • von Sydow, M., Hagmayer, Y., & Meder, B. (2016). Transitive reasoning distorts induction in causal chains. Memory & Cognition, 44 (3), 469-487.

    • 2015

  • Colombo, M., & Hartmann, S. (2015). Bayesian cognitive science, unification, and explanation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  • Eichhorn, C., & Kern-Isberner, G. (2015). Qualitative and semi-quantitative inductive reasoning with conditionals. KI-Künstliche Intelligenz, 29(3), 279-289.
  • Eichhorn, C., & Kern-Isberner, G. (2015). Using inductive reasoning for completing OCF-networks. Journal of Applied Logic, 605-627.
  • Hoffrage, U., Krauss, S., Martignon, L. & Gigerenzer, G. (2015). Natural frequencies improve Bayesian reasoning in simple and complex inference tasks. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1473.
  • Koscholke, J., & Schippers, M. (2015). Against relative overlap measures of coherence. Synthese.
  • Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2015). Agents and causes: Dispositional intuitions as a guide to causal structure. Cognitive Science, 39, 65-95.
  • Nejasmic, J., Bucher, L., & Knauff, M. (2015). The construction of spatial mental models—a new view on the continuity effect. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68 (9), 1794-1812.
  • Ragni, M., & Stolzenburg, F. (2015). Higher-Level Cognition and Computation: A Survey. KI-Künstliche Intelligenz, 29(3), 1-7.
  • Rott, H. (2015). A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements. Erkenntnis, 80, 167-189.
  • Schippers, M. (2015). Competing accounts of contrastive coherence. Synthese.
  • Schippers, M. (2015). Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Coherentism. Studia Logica, 103 (5), 955-984.
  • Schippers, M., & Siebel, M. (2015). Inconsistency as a touchstone for coherence measures. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 30(1), 11-41.
  • Schurz, G.. (2015). Causality and unification: How causality unifies statistical regularities. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 30(1), 73-95.
  • Skovgaard-Olsen, N. (2015). The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments. Synthese.
  • Spohn, W. (2015). Conditionals: A unifying ranking-theoretic perspective. Philosophers' Imprint, 15(1).
  • Sprenger, J. (2015). A novel solution to the problem of old evidence. Philosophy of Science, 82, 383-401 .
  • Suter, R. S., Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., Endestad, T., & Biele, G. (2015). The neural basis of risky choice with affective outcomes. PLoS ONE, 10(4):e0122475.
  • Thorn, P. (2015). The Inheritance of Defaults in the Case of Exceptional Subclasses. The Reasoner, 9, 93.
  • Thrash, T., Kapadia, M., Moussaïd, M., Wilhelm, C., Helbing, D., Sumner, R. W., & Holscher, C. (2015). Evaluation of control interfaces for desktop virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 24,, 322-334.
  • Wichary, S., Pachur, T., & Li, M. (2015). Risk-taking tendencies in prisoners and nonprisoners: Does gender matter? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(5), 504-514.
  • Wulff, D. U., Hills, T. T., & Hertwig, R. (2015). How short- and long-run aspirations impact search and choice in decisions from experience. Cognition, 144, 29-37.

    • 2014

  • Colombo, M. (2014). Explaining social norm compliance: A plea for neural representations Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(2), 217-238.
  • Colombo, M. (2014). Neural representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content and vitiated verdicts: A reply to Hutto & Myin (2013). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(2), 257-274.
  • Colombo, M. (2014). Two neurocomputational building blocks of social norm compliance. Biology & Philosophy, 29(1), 71-88.
  • Colombo, M., Stankevicius, A., & Seriès, P. (2014). Benefits of social vs. non-social feedback on learning and generosity. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1-9.
  • Crupi, V., & Girotto, V. (2014). From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1-3.
  • Crupi, V., & Tentori, K. (2014). Measuring information and confirmation. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 47, 81-90.
  • Dawid, R., Hartmann, S., & Sprenger, J. (2014). The no alternatives argument. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(1): 213-234.
  • Jekel, M., Glöckner, A., Bröder, A., & Maydych, V. (2014). Approximating rationality under incomplete information: Adaptive inferences for missing cue values based on cue-discrimination. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(2), 129-147.
  • Kern-Isberner, G., & Eichhorn, C. (2014). Structural inference from conditional knowledge bases. Studia Logica, 102(4), 751-769.
  • Meder, B., Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2014). Structure induction in diagnostic causal reasoning. Psychological Review, 121, 277-301.
  • Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2014). Indicators of causal agency in physical interactions: The role of the prior context. Cognition, 132(3), 485-490.
  • Nelson, J. D., Divjak, B., Gudmundsdottir, G., Martignon, L. F., & Meder, B. (2014). Children's information search is sensitive to environmental probabilities. Cognition, 130, 74-80.
  • Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., & Wolkewitz, R. (2014). The affect gap in risky choice: Affect-rich outcomes attenuate attention to probability information. Decision, 1(1), 64-78.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2014). Reasoning about uncertain conditionals. Studia Logica, 102, 849-866.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Douven, I. (2014). Formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 199-221.
  • Pleskac, T. J., & Hartwig, R. (2014). Ecologically rational choice and the structure of the environment Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(5), 2000-2019.
  • Rott, H. (2014). Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change. The Logica Yearbook 2013, 187-205.
  • Rott, H. (2014). Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning. Erkenntnis, 79, 1219-1252.
  • Rott, H. (2014). Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 68, 237-241.
  • Schippers, M. (2014). Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism. Synthese, 191(16), 3821-3845.
  • Schurz, G.. (2014). Cognitive success: Instrumental justifications of normative systems of reasoning. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 625.
  • Singmann, H., Klauer, K. C., & Kellen, D. (2014). Intuitive logic revisited: new data and a Bayesian mixed model meta-analysis. PloS one, 9(4), e94223.
  • Singmann, H., Klauer, K. C., & Over, D. (2014). New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.
  • Spohn, W. (2014). Replik auf die Kommentare von Ralf Busse und Hans Rott. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 68, 100-103.
  • Spohn, W. (2014). Précis von The Laws of Belief. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 68, 82-89.
  • Spohn, S. (2014). The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 4, 385-408.
  • Thorn, P., M. (2014). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43(2), 283-302.
  • Thorn, P. D., & Schurz, G. (2014). A Utility based evaluation of logico-probabilistic systems. Studia Logica, 102, 867-890.

    • 2013

  • Brun, G., & Rott, H. (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese, 190, 4041-4063.
  • Colombo, M. (2013). Leges sine moribus vanae: Does language make moral thinking possible? Biology & Philosophy, 28, 501-521.
  • Colombo, M. (2013). Moving forward (and beyond) the modularity debate: A network perspective. Philosophy of Science, 80(3), 356-377.
  • Crupi, V., Chater, N., & Tentori, K. (2013). New axioms for probability and likelihood ratio measures. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64, 189-204.
  • Crupi, V., & Tentori, K. (2013). Confirmation theory as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 11(4), 364-372. Erratum (2014). Journal of Applied Logic, 12(3), 230-231.
  • Hertwig, R., & Volz, K. G. (2013). Abnormality, rationality, and sanity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(11), 547-549.
  • Klauer, K. C., & Singmann, H. (2013). Does logic feel good? Testing for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(4), 1265-1273.
  • Knauff, M., Bucher, L., Krumnack, A., & Nejasmic, J. (2013). Spatial belief revision. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 25(2), 147-156.
  • Lisciandra, C., Postma-Nilsenová, M., & Colombo, M. (2013). Conformorality: A study on group conditioning of normative judgment. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(4), 751-764.
  • Meder, B., Le Lec, F., & Osman, M. (2013). Decision making in uncertain times: what can cognitive and decision sciences say about or learn from economic crises? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(6), 257-260.
  • Nagel, J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2013). Deconfounding distance effects in judgments of moral obligation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(3), 789-796.
  • Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., Gigerenzer, G., & Brandstätter, E. (2013). Testing process predictions of models of risky choice: A quantitative model comparison approach. Frontiers in Psychology, 4:646.
  • Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., & Rieskamp, J. (2013). Intuitive judgments of social statistics: How exhaustive does sampling need to be? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 1059-1077.
  • Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., Gigerenzer, G., & Brandstätter, E. (2013). Testing process predictions of models of risky choice: A quantitative model comparison approach. Frontiers in Psychology, 4:646.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2013). The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective. Thinking & Reasoning, 19, 329-345.
  • Ragni, M., & Knauff, M. (2013). A theory and a computational model of spatial reasoning with preferred mental models. Psychological Review, 120(3). 561-588.
  • Spohn, W. (2013). A ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals. Cognitive Science, 37, 1074-1106.
  • Tentori, K., & Crupi, V., (2013). Why quantum probability does not explain the conjunction fallacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, 308-310.
  • Tentori, K., Crupi, V., & Russo, S. (2013). On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(1), 235-255.

    • 2012

  • Crupi V., & Tentori, K. (2012). A second look at the logic of explanatory power (with two novel representation theorems). Philosophy of Science, 79, 365-385.
  • Dumas F., Gonzalez M., Girotto V., Pascal C., Botton J.-F., & Crupi V. (2012). The context of available options affects healthcare decisions: A generalization study. Medical Decision Making, 32, 815-819.
  • Feldbacher, C. J. (2012). Meta-induction and the wisdom of crowds. Analyse & Kritik, 34(2), 339-366.
  • Hartmann, S., & Sprenger, J. (2012). Judgment aggregation and the problem of tracking the truth. Synthese, 187(1), 209-221.
  • Jekel, M., Glöckner, A., Fiedler, S., & Bröder, A. (2012). The rationality of different kinds of intuitive decision processes. Synthese, 189(1), 147-160.
  • Meder, B., & Nelson, J. D. (2012). Information search with situation-specific reward functions. Judgment and Decision Making, 7, 119-148.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2012). Experiments on Aristotle's thesis: towards an experimental philosophy of conditionals. The Monist, 95, 223-240.
  • Spohn, W. (2012). Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box. Synthese, 187, 95-122.
  • Schurz, G. (2012). Meta-induction in epistemic networks and social spread of knowledge. Episteme, 9, 151-170.
  • Schurz, G., & Thorn, P. D. (2012). Reward versus risk in uncertain inference: theorems and simulations. Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(4), 574-612.
  • Thorn, P., & Schurz, G. (2012). Meta-induction and the wisdom of crowds. Analyse & Kritik, 34(2), 339-365.
  • Zhao J., Crupi V., Tentori K., Fitelson B., & Osherson D. (2012). Updating: Learning vs. supposing. Cognition, 124, 373-378.

    • 2011

  • Jekel, M., Fiedler, S., & Glöckner, A. (2011). Diagnostic task selection for strategy classification in judgment and decision making: Theory, validation, and implementation in R. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(8), 782-799.
  • Singmann, H., & Klauer, K. C. (2011). Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 17(3), 247-281.
  • Thorn, P. (2011). Undercutting defeat via reference properties of differing arity: A reply to Pust. Analysis 71, 662-667.
  • Waldmann, M. R. (2011). Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(5), 273-274.